Wright v. Macerich Westcor Management LLC
Court Docket Sheet

District of Arizona

2:2009-cv-00710 (azd)

ORDER denying {{8}} Defendant Macerich Westcor Management, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Case. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 8/3/09.

Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 1 of 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Rita Wright, an individual,) No. CV 09-710-PHX-SRB) 10 Plaintiff,) ORDER) 11 vs.)) 12) Macerich Westcor Management, LLC, a) 13 Delaware limited liability company, d/b/a) Chandler Fashion Center,) 14) Defendant.) 15)) 16 17 18 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Macerich Westcor Management, 19 LLC’s Motion to Dismiss ("Def.’s Mot.") (Doc. 8). 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff Rita Wright is a resident of Mesa, Arizona and the "long-term companion and 22 caretaker for Ronald Roper," with whom she lives. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Mr. Roper has multiple 23 sclerosis and uses a wheelchair. (Id.) Defendant Macerich Westcor Management manages 24 the Chandler Fashion Center, a shopping mall in Chandler, Arizona. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4; Def.’s 25 Reply in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. ("Def.’s Reply") at 2 n.1.) Ms. Wright and Mr. Roper used to 26 live in Chandler, near the Chandler Fashion Center, and they still attend a church there on 27 a regular basis. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff and Mr. Roper have visited the mall, "most recently 28 in April[] 2008, to enjoy the goods and services at the shopping center." (Id.) The Complaint Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 2 of 9 1 alleges that while visiting the mall, Mr. Roper encountered physical barriers to accessing the 2 facility in his wheelchair, including excessively steep slopes in curb ramps, walkways, and 3 parking spaces, a lack of wheelchair accessible dining tables in the food court, and 4 uninsulated drainage pipes in a men’s restroom. (Compl. ¶ 19.) As a result of these barriers, 5 Plaintiff alleges she is "deterred from returning because of the discriminatory conditions on 6 the property." Plaintiff argues in her Response to Defendant’s Motion ("Pl.’s Resp."), 7 "[W]hile [she] may enter and patronize Defendant’s property alone, the essence of her 8 complaint is that the existence of discriminatory conditions on the property interfere[s] with 9 her right to enjoy going to the mall with her longtime companion, a privilege enjoyed by non-10 disabled couples." (Pl.’s Resp. at 7.) 11 Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief under the Americans with Disabilities 12 Act ("ADA") and the Arizonans with Disabilities Act ("AzDA"), as well as attorneys’ fees 13 and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and compensatory damages under the AzDA. 14 (Compl. at 7.) 15 II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS 16 A. Motion to Dismiss 17 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require "a short and plain statement of the claim 18 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. 19 Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, dismissal for insufficiency of a complaint 20 is proper if the complaint fails to state a claim on its face. Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 633 F.2d 21 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1980). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based 22 on either: (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts to support a 23 cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); 24 Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In determining 25 whether an asserted claim can be sustained, all allegations of material fact are taken as true 26 and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Clegg v. Cult Awareness 27 Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has explained that factual 28 allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl.-2-Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 3 of 9 1 Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the issue 2 is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to 3 offer evidence to support the claims. Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249. 4 B. Associational Standing Under the ADA 5 The parties dispute whether Ms. Wright has standing in this action. Standing has both 6 constitutional and prudential components. Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, a 7 plaintiff does not have standing unless he can show (1) an "injury in fact" that is concrete and 8 particularized and actual or imminent (not conjectural or hypothetical); (2) that the injury is 9 fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed 10 to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. 11 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 12 Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). Even when the constitutional 13 minima of standing are present, prudential concerns may impose limitations. Elk Grove 14 Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004). For example, prudence may compel 15 a court to recognize only certain forms of injury. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 16 164-65 (1997) (for statutory claim, injury must be within the zone of interests protected by 17 the statute); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984) 18 (even where a plaintiff has himself suffered an injury, he ordinarily "cannot rest his claim to 19 relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties" (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 20 499 (1975) (internal citation omitted))). To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, "the party 21 seeking review [must] be himself among the injured." Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563 22 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)). 23 In Secretary of State, the Supreme Court explained that the reasons for the rule that 24 plaintiffs must assert their own legal rights (rather than the rights or interests of third parties) 25 are twofold. "The limitation'frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on 26 constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their 27 constitutional application might be cloudy,’ and it assures the court that the issues before it 28 will be concrete and sharply presented." Secretary of State, 467 U.S. at 955 (quoting United-3-Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 4 of 9 1 States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)); see also Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 2 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that the standing requirements of Article III are only that the 3 party be injured by the challenged conduct, but that the Supreme Court has "further limited 4 standing, as a prudential matter, requiring that a party assert its own rights and interests[,] not 5 those of third parties" (citations omitted)). On a motion to dismiss, courts "‘presum[e] that 6 general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’" 7 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 8 889 (1990)). 9 Title III of the ADA provides that "no individual shall be discriminated against on the 10 basis of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12182. "Disability" is defined by the statute as a physical 11 or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity, a record of 12 having such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. Id. § 12102(1). 13 Under the ADA, no person with a disability may be denied the "full and equal enjoyment. 14.. of any place of public accommodation." Id. The statutory definition of "public 15 accommodation" includes "a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping 16 center, or other sales or rental establishment." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). Section 12182(E) 17 of the ADA provides that it is also illegal to "exclude or otherwise deny equal goods, 18 services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities to an 19 individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the 20 individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association." Title III provides 21 injunctive relief against private entities that discriminate against people with disabilities. 42 22 U.S.C. § 12188(a); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674-75 (2001). Damages are not 23 recoverable under Title III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1); Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 24 (9th Cir. 2002).1 25 26 1 The AzDA contains a virtually identical provision: "It is discriminatory to exclude 27 or otherwise deny equal goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations or other opportunities to an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have 28 a relationship or association." A.R.S. § 41-1492.02(F). For the purposes of that subsection,-4-Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 5 of 9 1 Under Title III of the ADA, discrimination includes "a failure to remove architectural 2 barriers... where such removal is readily achievable[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 3 "Readily achievable" means "easily accomplishable or able to be carried out without much 4 difficulty or expense." Id. § 12181(9). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a 5 plaintiff in an ADA barriers case satisfies the injury requirement of standing if he has 6 encountered barriers at the defendant’s premises and is deterred from patronizing the public 7 accommodation as a result of those barriers. Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1040 8 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff had suffered an injury that was concrete and 9 particularized because he alleged that he personally encountered barriers when he visited the 10 7-Eleven store and was deterred from returning because of the barriers); Skaff v. Meridien 11 N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 882, 838 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Pickern v. Holiday 12 Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2002)) (same). 13 To make out a prima facie case of associational discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 14 12182(E), Ms. Wright must demonstrate that she was denied "equal goods, services, 15 facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities" on account of a 16 known disability of an individual with whom she is known to be associated. "[T]o state a 17 valid claim for association discrimination under either statute, a plaintiff must allege some 18'specific, direct, and separate injury’ as a result of association with a disabled individual." 19 Glass v. Hillsboro Sch. Dist. 1J, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1288 (D. Or. 2001) (citing Micek v. 20 City of Chicago, No. 98 C 6757, 1999 WL 966970, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1999); Niemeier 21 v. Tri-State Fire Protection Dist., No. 99 C 7391, 2000 WL 1222207, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22 23 24 "discriminatory" includes "[a] failure to remove architectural barriers... that are structural 25 in nature in existing facilities...." Id. § 41-1492.02(F)(4). Under the AzDA, a plaintiff can seek injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. Id. §§ 41-1492.08(B), 41-1492.09(B)(2). 26 The Court will only discuss the ADA in this Order, but the analysis is equally applicable to 27 the AzDA claim. If Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to pass Rule 12(b)(6) muster for the purposes of the ADA, she has also met the requirements of the AzDA. See A.R.S. § 41-28 1492.06(B).-5-Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 6 of 9 1 24, 2000)). This "specific, direct, and separate injury" component is a prudential standing 2 requirement. 3 The Court is aware of no case that is exactly on point. Defendant cites Larsen v. 4 Carnival Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2003). In Larsen, the court ruled that the 5 wife of a disabled cruise ship passenger could not establish that she was subjected to 6 unlawful discrimination based on her association with her husband. 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1349-7 50. The Larsen court concluded that Mrs. Larsen was not asked to leave the ship when her 8 husband was disembarked for medical reasons, so no adverse action had been taken against 9 her. Id. Defendant analogizes Larsen to the instant case, arguing that Ms. Wright has never 10 been excluded or otherwise denied the use or enjoyment of the Chandler Fashion Center. 11 (Def.’s Mot. at 6.) Defendant argues that Title III does not create a basis for recovery for 12 someone who has not been refused admittance or denied service, but simply would prefer to 13 enjoy the public accommodation with a disabled companion. (Id.) Plaintiff, on the other 14 hand, points to Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., No. CIV.A. H-00-2649, 2002 WL 15 34100212 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 356 F.3d 631 (5th Cir. 2004), 16 rev’d on other grounds, 545 U.S. 119 (2005). The district court in Spector denied in part a 17 motion to dismiss after considering associational standing, reasoning that companions of 18 cruise ship passengers with disabilities had suffered a distinct injury when their companions 19 were not able to book more desirable cabins on a ship due to accessibility problems. 2002 20 WL 34100212, at *15. "The companion plaintiffs took the cruises not only to accompany 21 their disabled friends, but also to enjoy the cruise itself." Id. Plaintiff also cites a hypothetical 22 example explained by the court in Glass v. Hillsboro School District 1J: 23 Everyone, generally, has the right to go into a movie theater. If a non-disabled companion is excluded from the theater because of his or her association with 24 a disabled individual (for example, no room in the theater for wheelchairs), then the non-disabled companion suffers direct harm to his or her own 25 independent right to be in the theater because of the association with a disabled person. 26 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1291-92. 27 28-6-Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 7 of 9 1 Both parties also point to the commentary accompanying the federal regulations 2 implementing this provision of the ADA, which includes several examples of situations that 3 would be covered by the law. "For example, it would be a violation of [28 C.F.R. § 36.205] 4 for a day care center to refuse admission to a child whose brother has HIV...." 56 Fed. Reg. 5 7452-01, 7462. The commentary explains that this protection is not limited to family 6 members of people with disabilities. "Therefore, if a place of public accommodation refuses 7 admission to a person with cerebral palsy,... his or her companions have an independent 8 right of action under the ADA and this section." Id. 9 In the case at bar, Mr. Roper is not bringing any claims against Defendant. Rather, the 10 only claims in the Complaint are those of his companion, Ms. Wright, who alleges that she 11 and Mr. Roper "have visited the Defendant’s property, most recently in April[] 2008, to 12 enjoy the goods and services at the shopping center...." (Compl. ¶ 8.) The Complaint 13 further alleges that Mr. Roper and Ms. Wright "plan to return to the Defendant’s shopping 14 center... but are deterred from returning because of discriminatory conditions on the 15 property." (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff argues that her injury is not directly with respect to the 16 architectural barriers, but rather that "the existence of discriminatory conditions on the 17 property interfere[s] with her right to enjoy going to the mall with her longtime companion, 18 a privilege enjoyed by non-disabled couples." (Pl.’s Resp. at 7.) 19 After careful consideration, the Court finds Plaintiff’s reasoning more persuasive. The 20 injury that Ms. Wright alleges is distinct from that of Mr. Roper. Her situation is more like 21 the hypothetical movie-goer described in Glass or the cruise ship companion passengers in 22 Spector than it is like the cases cited by Defendant. For instance, the actual plaintiffs in Glass 23 who sought to bring associational discrimination cases were the parents of autistic children, 24 and the court in that case found that the parents did not have a separate interest in the 25 defendants’ services, other than the interest of their children. 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. Here, 26 Ms. Wright alleges in her Complaint that she is denied "the full and equal enjoyment" of the 27 Chandler Fashion Center, to wit, she cannot visit the mall with Mr. Roper, a problem not 28 faced by couples without disabilities. (Compl. ¶ 25; Pl.’s Resp. at 7.)-7-Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 8 of 9 1 Ms. Wright’s situation is not analogous to those in which associational discrimination 2 claims have been dismissed; she is more like the plaintiffs whose claims have been 3 successful, at least at the motion to dismiss stage of the litigation. Compare Briggs v. YMCA 4 of Snohomish County, No. C08-1326 RSM, 2009 WL 1390474, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 5 2009) (finding that the plaintiff did not have the right to bring a claim on behalf of his 6 allegedly disabled brother, who was told he could not enter the YMCA with his service dog); 7 and Niemeier, 2000 WL 1222207, at *3-4 (finding that employee whose insurer denied 8 coverage for wife’s infertility treatment could not bring an associational discrimination 9 claim); and Micek, 1999 WL 966970, at *3-4 (dismissing associational discrimination claims 10 of employee whose insurance claims for speech therapy services for his disabled dependents 11 were denied); and Simenson v. Hoffman, No. 95 C 1401, 1995 WL 631804 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 12 1995) (determining that parents of disabled child who brought associational discrimination 13 claim after doctor refused to treat their son did not have standing because their claim was not 14 distinct from their son’s); with Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 15 1176 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss and finding that father of child with 16 disabilities had separate claim for associational discrimination because of problems with 17 accessibility of sports arena); and Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 1994) 18 (permitting associational discrimination claims under Title II of the ADA where non-disabled 19 plaintiffs also participated in mental health counseling at issue). Ms. Wright’s alleged injury 20 is separate and distinct from Mr. Roper’s. Accordingly, the Court concludes that she has 21 sufficiently stated a claim for relief by way of associational standing. 22 C. Redressability 23 Defendant also argues, without citing any authority, that Plaintiff "cannot demonstrate 24 redressability, the third prong of the standing test." (Def.’s Mot. at 6.) If, however, the Court 25 were to direct Defendant to modify the Chandler Fashion Center to alleviate the problems 26 Plaintiff has identified (e.g. reducing the slope of the curb cuts, parking spaces, and 27 walkways, creating wheelchair accessible seating in the food court, and insulating the 28 drainage pipes in the men’s restroom), then presumably Mr. Roper would be able to access-8-Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 11 Filed 08/03/09 Page 9 of 9 1 the shopping center, and Plaintiff would no longer be injured by not being able to visit the 2 mall with her companion. Therefore, redressability does not appear to the Court to pose a 3 problem at this stage. 4 D. Scope of the Title III Associational Discrimination Claims 5 Defendant is concerned that if Ms. Wright’s case is allowed to go forward, the scope 6 of associational discrimination claims under Title III of the ADA will be "impermissibly 7 expand[ed]." (Def.’s Mot. at 7.) Defendant argues that the Chandler Fashion Center took no 8 affirmative step to prevent Plaintiff from visiting the mall and that Ms. Wright’s deterrence 9 theory leads down a slippery slope. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendant contends that Congress’s 10 limitations on associational discrimination claims would be "gutted" if friends and 11 companions of people with disabilities could advance claims such as these. (Id. at 8.) 12 However, the Court is confident that the other prudential limits on standing will keep the 13 floods of associational discrimination cases in check. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 For the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to 16 support a claim under Title III of the ADA. 17 IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant Macerich Westcor Management, LLC’s 18 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8). 19 DATED this 3rd day of August, 2009. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28-9-

ORDER pursuant to {{41}} Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice with each party to bear his, her or its own attorneys' fees and costs. The Court will retain jurisdiction until February 1, 2012 solely for the purpose of enforcing the parties' settlement agreement. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 06/24/10.

Case 2:09-cv-00710-SRB Document 42 Filed 06/24/10 Page 1 of 1 1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 6 7 Rita Wright,) Case No.: CV 09-00710-PHX-SRB Plaintiff,) 8 vs) ORDER FOR DISMISSAL 9) Macerich Westcor Management LLC,) 10 et. al.,) Defendants) 11)) 12) 13) 14 Pursuant to the Stipulation for Dismissal and good cause appearing, 15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED dismissing the Amended Complaint with 16 prejudice with each party to bear his, her or its own attorneys' fees and costs. The 17 Court will retain jurisdiction until February 1, 2012 solely for the purpose of 18 19 enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement. 20 21 Dated this 24th day of June, 2010. 22 23 24 25 26

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Description
1
04/07/2009
COMPLAINT. Filing fee received: $ 350.00, receipt number 09700000000002716339, filed by Rita Wright.
1
Exhibit
2
Summons
3
Civil Cover Sheet
3 Attachments
04/07/2009
This case has been assigned to the Honorable Susan R. Bolton. All future pleadings or documents should bear the correct case number: CV 09-00710-PHX-SRB. This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no PDF document associated with this entry. (Entered by REK) (Text entry; no document attached.)
2
04/07/2009
Notice re Magistrate Consent Form
3
04/07/2009
Summons Issued as to Macerich Westcor Management LLC. (REK). *** IMPORTANT: You must select "Document and stamps" or "Document and comments" on the print screen in order for the court seal to appear on the summons you print.
4
04/13/2009
SUMMONS Returned Executed by Rita Wright. Macerich Westcor Management LLC served on 4/9/2009.
5
04/24/2009
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO ANSWER COMPLAINT by Rita Wright, Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
1
Text of Proposed Order
1 Attachment
6
04/28/2009
ORDER pursuant to 5 Stipulation For Extension of Time To Answer Complaint: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Macerich Westcor Management LLC shall have to and including May 13, 2009 to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 4/28/09.
7
05/12/2009
Corporate Disclosure Statement by Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
8
05/12/2009
MOTION to Dismiss Case by Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
9
06/02/2009
RESPONSE in Opposition re 8 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Rita Wright.
10
06/11/2009
REPLY in Support re 8 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
11
08/03/2009
ORDER denying 8 Defendant Macerich Westcor Management, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Case. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 8/3/09.
12
08/05/2009
ORDER: Scheduling Conference set on 10/5/09 at 01:00 PM before Judge Susan R Bolton. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 8/5/09.
13
08/17/2009
ANSWER to Complaint by Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
14
09/25/2009
REPORT re: Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting by Rita Wright.
15
09/28/2009
Notice re Service of Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosure Statement by Macerich Westcor Management LLC
16
10/05/2009
Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Susan R Bolton: Scheduling Conference held on 10/5/09. Deadlines discussed and entered. Scheduling Order to follow. A copy of the Joint Proposed Pretrial Order is provided to counsel this date. (Court Reporter Elizabeth Lemke)
17
10/05/2009
SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 4/23/2010. Dispositive motions due by 5/28/2010. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 10/25/2010. Final Pretrial Conference set for 11/1/2010 at 09:00 AM before Judge Susan R Bolton. Bench Trial set for 11/9/2010 at 09:00 AM before Judge Susan R Bolton. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 10/5/09.
18
10/06/2009
Notice re Rule 34 Request for Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes by Rita Wright
19
10/07/2009
Notice re Plaintiff's Initial Disclosure Statement by Rita Wright
20
10/08/2009
Notice re Service of Discovery to Defendant by Rita Wright
21
11/05/2009
Notice re Service of Defendant Macerich Westcor Management, LLC's First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff by Macerich Westcor Management LLC
22
11/05/2009
NOTICE of Deposition of Rita Wright, filed by Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
23
11/05/2009
NOTICE of Deposition of Ronald Roper, filed by Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
24
11/23/2009
Notice re Service of Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery Requests by Macerich Westcor Management LLC
25
12/07/2009
MOTION to Amend/Correct re Complaint by Rita Wright.
1
Exhibit Amended Complaint - Unmarked
2
Exhibit Amended Complaint - Marked
2 Attachments
26
12/08/2009
Notice re Amended Notice of Deposition of Rita Wright by Macerich Westcor Management LLC
27
12/08/2009
Notice re Service of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Discovery by Rita Wright
28
12/17/2009
NOTICE of Deposition of Paul S. Farber, filed by Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
29
12/18/2009
STIPULATION Granting Plaintiff Leave to File Amended Complaint by Macerich Westcor Management LLC, Rita Wright.
1
Text of Proposed Order
1 Attachment
30
12/18/2009
ORDER - The Court having considered the 29 Stipulation Granting Plaintiff Leave to File Amended Complaint, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pla shall be permitted to file the Amended Complaint appended as Exhibit A to Pla's 25 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Pla's 25 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 12/18/09.
31
12/18/2009
AMENDED COMPLAINT against Macerich Westcor Management LLC, Macerich Management Company, TWC Chandler LLC, filed by Rita Wright.
32
01/07/2010
SEPARATE ANSWER to 31 Amended Complaint by Macerich Westcor Management LLC.
33
01/13/2010
Minute Order: Discovery Dispute Hearing set for 1/15/2010 at 02:30 PM before Judge Susan R Bolton. This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no PDF document associated with this entry.
34
01/15/2010
Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge Susan R Bolton: Discovery Dispute Hearing held on 1/15/2010 at the request of defense counsel re: disclosure of expert report. Discussion held. The Court's Rule 16 Order prohibits expert depositions until both sides have disclosed their expert reports. If the expert report lists substantially greater number of barriers than that alleged in the complaint, counsel should agree to a later disclosure of defendant's expert report so Plaintiff has enough time to file a responsive report. (Court Reporter Elizabeth Lemke)
35
01/20/2010
SUMMONS Submitted by Rita Wright
36
01/20/2010
SUMMONS Submitted by Rita Wright
37
01/21/2010
Summons Issued as to Macerich Management Company, TWC Chandler LLC. *** IMPORTANT: You must select "Document and stamps" or "Document and comments" on the print screen in order for the court seal to appear on the summons you print.
1
https://ecf.azd.uscourts.gov/doc1/02515274419" onClick="goDLS{{'/doc1/02515274419','436281','97','','2','1','',''}};">1</a> Summons)
1 Attachment
38
01/25/2010
Notice re Service of First Set of Supplemental Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories by Macerich Westcor Management LLC
39
01/29/2010
Notice re Service Of Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosure Statement by Rita Wright
40
02/26/2010
Notice re Service of Expert Witness Disclosure by Macerich Westcor Management LLC
41
06/23/2010
STIPULATION of Dismissal by Rita Wright.
1
Text of Proposed Order Order for Dismissal
1 Attachment
42
06/24/2010
ORDER pursuant to 41 Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice with each party to bear his, her or its own attorneys' fees and costs. The Court will retain jurisdiction until February 1, 2012 solely for the purpose of enforcing the parties' settlement agreement. Signed by Judge Susan R Bolton on 06/24/10.
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